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Monetary Control: 
Concepts, Issues, and 
a Reduced-Form Test 
Michael R. Darby 
Monetary-approach  models characteristically assume that goods, assets, 
or both are perfect substitutes internationally. For a nonreserve country 
maintaining pegged exchange rates, this implies that the central bank has 
no control over or influence on the country’s money supply but only 
determines how the demand-determined quantity is supplied by reserve 
flows and domestic credit creation. The successful exercise of  monetary 
control under pegged exchange rates therefore contradicts the monetary 
approach and the assumption that goods,  assets, or both  are perfect 
substitutes internationally. 
The above argument provides the basis for this chapter’s tests of the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments.’ Before proceeding to 
the empirical tests, it is necessary to formulate a general model which is 
consistent  with  the possible  exercise  of  monetary  control  but  which 
subsumes the monetary approach as a special case. Because the observed 
negative correlation between reserve flows and domestic-credit changes 
can  be  explained  by  sterilization  policies  as  well  as  the  monetary- 
approach channels,  it  is  important that the general  model allow  for 
sterilization policies whether or not monetary control is present. 
Standard monetary-approach  discussions assume that no sterilization 
operations are attempted by the central banks of nonreserve c0untries.l 
Although a number of authors have noted that sterilization policies may 
1. These tests supplement-and  confirm-the  empirical results from the Mark I11 Inter- 
national  Transmission  Model.  As  reported in  part  I1 of  this volume,  direct  structural 
estimates indicated that neither goods nor assets were perfect substitutes internationally. 
Thus, contrary to the monetary approach, nonreserve central banks exercised a degree of 
monetary control within the quarter. 
2. To cite the locus classicus, see, for example, Frenkel and Johnson (1976, passim, esp. 
pp. 152-53).  An important recent exception is a theoretical analysis by Boyer (1979) which 
uses a portfolio-balance approach. 
291 292  Chapter Ten 
bias empirical tests of the monetary appr~ach,~  adherents of the approach 
have argued that sterilization is neither significant in magnitude nor an 
important source of  bias.4 Other authors are less sanguine about the 
impossibility and insignificance of  sterilization.’ In particular, the esti- 
mates of  the Mark I11 International Transmission Model, reported in 
chapter  6  above, indicate  that  the direct  effects on national  money 
supplies are very largely sterilized by offsetting transactions in domestic 
credit instruments. 
Since the no-sterilization (or exogenous-domestic-credit) assumption 
is both factually untrue and controversial, it appears to be an obfuscating 
rather than simplifying assumption. It will be shown in section 10.1  below 
that a simple monetary-approach model can be presented without any 
reliance on this assumption or the ancillary concept of  domestic credit. 
Only if sterilization is complete can one infer anything about the presence 
or absence of  monetary control. 
Section 10.1 outlines the general model incorporating  sterilization 
which encompasses as a special case a modified version of  the monetary 
approach in which  both  reserve  flows and  domestic-credit flows are 
endogenous variables. Generally, nonreserve central banks can exercise 
control over their domestic money supply in the short run unless certain 
conditions which imply validity of the monetary approach are met. In this 
monetary-approach  special  case,  central  bank  attempts  to  exercise 
monetary control are futile and instead simply induce exaggerated re- 
serve flows. 
Section 10.2 presents a simple direct test of  whether determinants of 
monetary policy other than the current balance of  payments influenced 
the nominal money supply given foreign variables determining money 
demand. For quarterly data of  seven countries in our sample (Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United King- 
dom), all  but  the Netherlands showed clear evidence that monetary 
control was, in fact, exercised under the Bretton Woods system of pegged 
exchange rates. This evidence is strongly inconsistent with the validity of 
3. See, for example, Argy and Kouri (1974), Magee (1976), Maddala (1977, p. 253), and 
Darby (1980). 
4. I  can find no substantial  basis for the denigration  of  the existence of  substantial 
sterilization policies (implicit in money growth or interest-rate goals) beyond the assertion 
that they are impotent and therefore irrational (see, for example, quotations in footnotes 7 
and 9). In much cited pieces, Argy and Kouri (1974) and Genberg (1976) used rudimentary 
reaction functions and quarterly data to obtain significant estimates of sterilization, but this 
did not lead to substantial changes in the relevant monetary-approach coefficients. Con- 
nolly and Taylor (1979) came to similar conclusions using both annual and biennial observa- 
tions. Stockman (1979) used a sophisticated reaction function, but again came to the same 
conclusion. The basic flaw in these tests is discussed below in footnote 16. 
5. For example, from their review of the earlier literature on sterilization and monetary 
control, Sweeney and Willett (1976, p. 444) conclude that “there is little evidence that such 
autonomy is impossible in the short-run, and considerable evidence it is possible.”  See 
especially the careful work of Herring and Marston (1977) on Germany. 293  Sterilization and Monetary Control 
the monetary approach to the balance of payments in either its standard 
or its modified form for analysis  of quarterly data. Thus there is a relevant 
“short run” within which central banks can and have exercised monetary 
control under pegged exchange rates. 
10.1  Analysis 
The analysis proceeds in  four steps: First, sterilization is formally 
defined in terms of  the money supply reaction function of the central 
bank. Next, a modified monetary approach is presented which is consis- 
tent with partial sterilization. Then a more general model is developed in 
which the central bank may control its domestic money supply; if  this 
control is  not present, the model  reduces to the modified  monetary 
approach. Finally, the conditions for monetary control are interpreted in 
terms of  responsiveness of capital flows, trade flows, and the expected 
depreciation of the exchange rate. 
10.1.1  Sterilization and the Money Supply Reaction Function 
The central bank of a nonreserve country will resist an incipient appre- 
ciation (for example) of its exchange rate by buying some foreign reserves 
with its domestic base money.6  This new base money increases the domes- 
tic money supply. Standard central bank procedure involves offsetting 
sales of  domestic  assets  (for  example, government  bonds)  for  base 
money. These offsetting transactions are said to sterilize the effect of the 
balance of payments on the money supply. 
In the standard monetary approach, the construct of domestic credit 
(base money less reserves) or its change has been assumed exogenous. 
This  assumption is  unwarranted  if  monetary  authorities sterilize the 
balance of  payments in whole or in part so that a balance-of-payments 
surplus induces a decrease in domestic credit. But, of course, the immedi- 
ate sterilization might be reversed so rapidly that for all practical pur- 
poses no sterilization occurred over a period of  observation such as a 
quarter.  Then  the  exogenous-domestic-credit  assumption  would  be 
acceptable for analysis of  quarterly data. 
A money supply reaction function provides a formal statement of the 
behavior of the monetary authorities working through the banking sys- 
tem. The existence and extent of sterilization are measured by the coef- 
ficient of the contemporaneous scaled balance of  payments in the reac- 
tion function. A general form of  this reaction function is 
B 
H 
(10.1)  AlogM=a-+Xp+u, 
6. The analysis is properly applied only to nonreserve countries if the reserve country 
(such as the United States) is on a fiat standard as discussed in Darby (1980). 294  Chapter Ten 
where M  is the nominal money supply, B the balance-of-payments sur- 
plus, H nominal base or  high-powered money, and X a vector containing 
all other variables which systematically affect the monetary authority’s 
behavior.  Note in  particular  that lagged  balances  of  payments  may 
appear in X since the issue of  ultimate concern is monetary control within 
the period of observation. If a  is 1,  then there is no sterilization since the 
balance of  payments  leads to a proportionate increase in the money 
supply. If a  is zero, then complete sterilization is practiced. Values of  a 
between 0 and 1  indicate partial sterilization. By way of  information, the 
Mark I11 estimates reported in table 6.8  above suggest that a  lies in the 
range from 0 to 0.2. 
The  meaning of equation (10.1) may be clarified by restating it in terms 
of domestic credit D.  Assuming a constant money multiplier, we have 
A log M=A  log H 
(10.2)  B  AD 
HH 
A log ME -  + - 
Substituting into equation (lO.l), we have 
(10.3)  B 
H  H 
--  AD -  (a  -  1)-  +xp  + u 
Thus we see that if  (Y  = 1 (no sterilization), then the reaction function 
determines domestic credit exogenously with respect to the balance of 
payments. If  (Y < 1,  then the central bank adjusts  domestic credit in whole 
(a  = 0) or  part (0 <  a  <1) to offset the effects of the balance of payments 
on money growth. In what follows, it will be seen that domestic credit is 
not a useful concept if  the central bank is concerned with money growth 
or the level of  interest rates (that is, if  (Y < 1). 
10.1.2  A Modified Monetary Approach 
While the received monetary approach has been based on the assump- 
tion  that nonreserve  countries do not  sterilize in whole  or part, this 
assumption is in no sense essential to the theoretical  approach.’  The 
really essential idea is that the domestic money supply is demand deter- 
mined given the exchange-rate-converted foreign price level and foreign 
7.  Harry Johnson (1976, pp. 152-53)  noted that the monetary approach “assumes-in 
some cases, asserts-that  these monetary inflows or outflows associated with surpluses or 
deficits are not sterilized-r  cannot be, within a period relevant to policy analysis-but 
instead influence the domestic money supply.” But Mussa (1976, p. 192) rightly observes 
that this assumption is unnecessary: “If the monetary authorities sterilize the balance-of- 
payments surplus created by, say, the imposition of  a tariff, then the monetary approach 
predicts that there will be a further surplus, equal to the reduction in the domestic source 
component of  the base which is implied by sterilization, and so on, until the sterilization 
operations cease.” This subsection merely works out the analytical framework sketched by 
Mussa. 295  Sterilization and Monetary Control 
interest rate. Any attempt of monetary authorities to vary the quantity of 
money from this demand-determined growth A log M will induce mas- 
sive capital flows, trade flows, or both until the money supply is equated 
to the parity value A log M. 
To illustrate, suppose that the demand-determined change in money is 
given by 
(10.4) 
If  the balance of  payments is indeed infinitely elastic with respect to 
incipient deviations from A log M,  then 
A log M = ZS +  E. 
B  -  = 0(A log M-  ZS -  E), 
H 
(10.5) 
where 8 is negative infinity. That is, any attempt by the central bank to 
increase (decrease) money relative to A log M results in an unbounded 
balance-of-payments deficit  (surplus).  So  equation  (5) implies, given 
0 = -m,  that 
(10.6) 
Equation (10.6) and the money supply reaction function (10.1) form a 
recursive system in which the change in money is determined by demand 
and this, plus the “domestic policy” portion (XP + u)  of monetary policy, 
determines the balance of  payments: 
A log A4 = ZS +  E. 
(10.7)  1 
Ha 
--  -  -(zs+E-xp-u). 
The balance of  payments is the inverse of  the sterilization parameter 
times the difference between the demand-determined money growth and 
the domestic-policy money growth. 
The modified monetary approach is illustrated graphically in figure 
10.1. The vertical line indicates the infinite elasticity of  the balance of 
payments with respect to incipient deviations of  money supply growth 
from  its  demand-determined level.  The positively sloped line  is  the 
money  supply  reaction  function.8 Their  intersection  determines  the 
equilibrium  balance  of  payments  (BIH)“q. Note that  an  increase  in 
unemployment which shifted the reaction function to the right (more 
money growth for a given balance of  payments) results in a substantial 
decrease in the balance of  payments which just balances the desire for 
more money growth. 
Figure  10.2 illustrates the impotence of  monetary policy under the 
8. If  this line were vertical  (a  = 0), there would generally be no equilibrium in the 
modified-monetary-approach  case. A negative slope (a  <  0) implies an unstable equilib- 
rium. 296  Chapter Ten 
B 
H 
Fig. 10.1  Determination of  balance of  payments in the modified mone- 
tary approach. 
modified monetary approach. Consider two vectors of  domestic policy 
variables X,  and XI:  Suppose that they differ only in the unemployment 
rate which is higher in case 1 so that the central bank desires a higher 
money growth rate, other things (i.e. BIH)  being equal: XI  p>Xop. In 
the standard monetary approach, in which domestic credit is determined 
without regard to the current balance of  payments (a  = l),  the scaled 
balance of  payments would fall in case 1  relative to case 0 by XI  p -  X,  p 
to maintain money growth at A log M. In the modified approach with 
partial sterilization, the scaled balance of payments falls by much more: 297  Sterilization and Monetary Control 
Fig. 10.2 
(10.8) 
Alog M=Z~+E  I 
Alog M=  a!  + Xop +  u  I 
M 
Effect of  shift in domestic policy goals in the modified mone- 
tary approach. 
That is, the balance-of-payments multiplier is -  l/a  times the change in 
the domestic-policy portion of monetary policy. 
In conclusion, the existence of partial sterilization does not imply any 
monetary control by a nonreserve central bank under pegged exchange 
rates. It may just result in accentuated balance-of-payments movements. 298  Chapter Ten 
10.1.3  A More General Model 
The assumption of exogenous determination of the arguments of the 
money demand function is deeply ingrained in the monetary-approach 
literature. Indeed, it is this assumption which allows one easily to trans- 
form statements about monetary equilibrium and money supply condi- 
tions into statements  about the balance of  payment^.^ If instead monetary 
and fiscal actions can move the domestic interest rate and price level 
relative  to the foreign variables  (not to mention  any  effect  on real 
income), then monetary actions will cause movements in money demand 
with more complicated effects on the balance of payments. The remain- 
der of  this section considers such nonmonetary-approach models which 
are nonetheless characterized by continuous equality of money supplied 
and money demanded. 
If  neither goods nor assets are perfect substitutes, it no longer follows 
that the balance of  payments will be infinitely elastic with respect to the 
money supply growth rate. The domestic interest and price level can 
move from the parity values which determine A log M=  Z6 +  E. Other 
factors (such as those appearing in trade supply and demand equations) 
represented by the vector S will  also play  a role in  determining the 
balance of  payments so that equation (10.5) is expanded to 
B  -  = 0 (A log M -  26  -E) + SSX, 
H 
(1  0.5’) 
where 0 > 0 > -m.  If  money growth were greater than Z6 +  E so that 
interest rates fell and prices rose relative to foreign values, the balance- 
of-payments surplus would fall through movements along noninfinitely 
elastic net-capital and net-export flow schedules. The empirical tests in 
section 10.2 do  not require a list of the elements in S so that we need not 
specify a full general equilibrium model here.  ’” 
Solving equation (10.5’) for A log M  yields 
(10.9) 
9. In a particularly relevant example, Genberg (1976, p. 322) argues that a sterilization 
policy “is implausible for several reasons. Firstly it implies an extraordinary stability of  the 
central  bank’s behaviour with respect to policy formation.  Secondly it implies that the 
sterilization is always of  a magnitude consistent with the demand for money, since with 
prices, interest rates and output determined by exogenous forces, the money market must be 
equilibrated through either reserveflows or domestic credit creation” (emphasis added). We 
have already seen that Genberg errs in supposing any difficulty in reconciling sterilization to 
lack of  monetary control. But note the absolute certainty that the arguments of  the money 
demand function are exogenously determined. 
10. One particular version of  equation (10.5’) or (10.9) would be the semireduced form 
obtained by solving for BIH and A log M  in the non-reaction-function equations in a country 
submodel in the Mark 111 International Transmission Model. Since those results have met 
monetary-approach  skepticism, a  less model-dependent  approach  is followed  here. In 
chapter 11 below, Daniel Laskar specifies a smaller-scale model and obtains similar results. 299  Sterilization and Monetary Control 
When equation (10.9) is combined with the reaction function (lO.l), we 
obtain  a  truly  simultaneous  system determining  A  log  A4  and  BIN 
together. The (reduced-form) solutions for the equilibrium values are 
26  A log M = -  xp  + -  SX  + - 
1 -  (Ye  1 -  (Ye  (Ye -  1 
(Y  (Ye  (10.10)  1 
(Ye 
€2  u+ -  f- 
1-a0  (Ye-1 
1 
(10.11)  SX + -  Z6  1  /Yo+- 
1 -  (Ye 
B-  0  --- 
(Ye -  1 
E.  0 
u+-  +- 
1-010  (Ye-1 
e 
It can be readily verified that as the balance-of-payments elasticity goes to 
negative infinity, the solutions (10.10) and (10.11) go to the modified- 
monetary-approach  solutions  (10.6)  and  (10.7).  Thus  the  modified 
monetary approach is, indeed, a special case (for 8 = -  03)  of this more 
general model. 
The more general model is illustrated by figure 10.3. The vertical line 
of figure 10.1  is replaced with a negatively sloped line relating the balance 
of  payments to money growth, the trade factors Sh, and the demand 
variables 26  +  E. The intersection of this line with the reaction function 
determines both the balance of  payments and money supply growth. In 
this case, as seen in figure 10.4, a desire to increase money growth (due to 
increased unemployment, say) in fact does increase money growth as well 
as decrease the balance of payments. The relative size of the two effects 
of  course depends on the slopes of  the two equations. But unlike the 
modified-monetary-approach case, there will be a correlation between 
movements in the domestic policy goals (Xp  + u) and changes in the 
money supply. 
Note that our model deletes the concept of  domestic credit entirely. 
One can derive the equilibrium value of  the scaled change in domestic 
credit from equations (10.10) and (lO.ll)-or (10.6) and (10.7) in the 
modified-monetary-approach special case-and  the usual identity (10.2). 
Trivial manipulations yield a domestic-credit equation, but only if  it is 
exogenously determined  (a  = 1) does domestic credit have causal or 
analytical significance. As an endogenous variable it adds nothing to the 
exposition.  As will be  discussed further in section 10.2, the negative 
correlation between the scaled change in domestic credit and the scaled 
balance of  payments makes for easy confusion in empirical analysis. 
10.1.4  Conditions for Monetary Control 
Unless the balance of  payments is infinitely elastic with respect to 
money growth, the central bank of a nonreserve country does exercise a 300  Chapter Ten 
(a)"' 
log M 
Fig.  10.3  Simultaneous  determination of  balance  of  payments  and 
nominal money in the more general model. 
degree of  monetary control. This control is not absolute (if a  >  0) in the 
sense that the balance-of-payments effects will enter the bank's choice of 
money growth, but neither will these effects completely overwhelm all 
other influences such as domestic unemployment or  inflation goals. Since 
lagged balances of  payments may  be counted among those  other in- 
fluences, the pegged system may be quite stable dynamically via specie- 
flow types of  adjustments, but this is a different process than envisioned 
by the monetary approach. This subsection examines in more detail the 
crucial parameter 
d (BIH) 
d A log M ' 
€I= 301  Sterilization and Monetary Control 
A log 
M 
Fig. 10.4  Effect of shift in  domestic policy goals in the more general 
model. 
Whether 8 is negative infinity has generally been addressed in terms of 
either assets or goods being perfect substitutes internationally. If  assets 
are perfect substitutes and the derivatives of  the interest rate R with 
respect  to money  growth  is  negative  due to a  liquidity effect,  then 
overwhelming net private capital flows will  force the domestic interest 
rate to its parity value. Similarly if  goods are perfect substitutes and the 
derivative of the contemporaneous price level P with respect to money 
growth is positive, overwhelming trade flows will force the domestic price 
level to its parity value. Either of  these cases is sufficient, but it is not 
necessary for either or both to hold in order to obtain 8 = --me 
To see this, write the scaled balance of  payments as the difference 
between the scaled balance of  trade and the scaled net private capital 
outflows: 302  Chapter Ten 
B-T  C 
HHH 
_=_-  (10.12) 
Scaled  net private  capital outflows will  be a function of  the current 
covered  interest  differential  (adjusted  for  expected  exchange-rate 
changes) and other variables which may be taken as given for the current 
period:" 
c  (10.13)  -  =  f (R -  p -  RF)  , 
H 
where p is the expected depreciation of the exchange rate (p<O implies 
an expected appreciation),  RFis the given foreign interest rate, and  SO^ 
is negative. We can find 0 by differentiating equation (10.12): 
d(BIH) -  - d(T/H)  dR  o= 
dA  log M  dA  log M -'  dA  log M 
dp  d(BIH) 
d(BIH) dA  log M ' 
+f'- 
1  d(T/H)  (10.14)  O= 
1  -f'-  dp  (dA  log M -'  dA  log M 
The multiplier 
states that if  the expected  depreciation  p responds to the size of  the 
balance of  payments (as an indicator of  the probability and size of  a 
revaluation), then the direct trade and capital-flows effects will be rein- 
forced by induced "speculative"  capital flows. These induced speculative 
capital flows will be overwhelming unless 
(10.15)  dp  <l.  f'qzE) 
Therefore, instead of the standard two, there are three conditions re- 
quired for a 0 > -  w: (1) Trade flows must not be overwhelming.'2 (2) The 
11. Among these other variables are, of course, the lagged covered interest differential 
since changes in the differential will cause portfolio revisions and hence net capital flows. 
These other variables are predetermined  within the period and so implicit in the function 
f(  ). Dooley and Isard (1980) provide a convenient recent exposition of the role of political 
risk in allowing R -  p -  RF  to differ from 0 when the interest rates refer to domestic rates 
rather than Eurorates. 
12. Formally, 
d(T/H) 
d log P  d A log M 
d log P ,  --30 303  Sterilization and Monetary Control 
direct effect on capital flows must not be ~verwhelming.’~  (3) Speculative 
capital flows must not be overwhelming (condition (10.15) must be met). 
Note that with costs of  adjustment and lags in information these three 
conditions may be met for certain periods of  observation but not for 
longer periods. With longer periods, lagged values of  BIH which are 
included in Xp  in the short-period analysis would instead be included in 
the contemporaneous value of  BIH. 
Obviously it is an empirical question whether these three conditions for 
monetary control are met for any relevant observation length, and we 
shall turn to some empirical evidence shortly in section 10.2. But first, the 
third condition (10.15) raises an interesting possibility. Suppose that the 
probability of a revaluation increases with the absolute value of the scaled 
balance of payments and the expected (signed) magnitude of the revalua- 
tion varies with the value of  the scaled balance of  payments. Then the 
expected depreciation might be determined by a function like 
where g’ is, of  course, negative. The derivative of  interest is 
(10.17) 
d(B/H) 
which increases in absolute value with the absolute value of  BIH. Thus 
there is some reason to suppose that condition (10.15) might hold for 
“small” absolute values of the scaled balance of payments but fail if  the 
central bank  attempted  a policy which  were “too”  inconsistent with 
international conditions. This is illustrated in figure 10.5. The central 
bank exercises a degree of  monetary control so long as it stays in the 
negatively sloped portion of  the international balance curve. If  it shifts 
into the vertical range, however, overwhelming speculative capital flows 
result.  l4 
10.2  Empirical Results 
Blejer (1979) applied the Granger-Sims causality test to quarterly data 
for France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom and found 
that scaled changes in domestic credit “cause” scaled reserve flows in all 
five (albeit as part of  a two-way feedback structure for Sweden and the 
13. Formally, 
dR  <m,  ’  d A log M 
14.  This provides another basis for Niehans’s (1974) idea that nonreserve countries can 
exercise monetary control within a limited range. 304  Chapter Ten 
.  (A  log M)eq 
Fig. 10.5  Simultaneous  determination  of  balance  of  payments  and 
money where potential unstable speculation limits monetary 
control. 
United Kingdom).  Blejer  erroneously  claimed  that this supports the 
monetary approach, but it in fact suggests short-run monetary control 
since the test shows that past changes in domestic credit affect current 
reserve flows. This evidence for short-run  monetary control is not conclu- 
sive, however, since past changes in domestic credit might have been 
induced by reserve-country actions which have current effects on foreign 
prices and hence reserve flow~.'~  It is simply not appropriate to apply an 
exogeneity test to two endogenous variables. 
The analysis of section 10.1  suggest two research strategies which focus 
directly on the issue of  monetary control: The first is to fully specify the 
more general model and estimate equations (10.1) and (10.9) by a simul- 
15. See Cassese and Lothian (chapter 4 above) for  this point. 305  Sterilization and Monetary Control 
taneous system method to  test whether 1/0 is, indeed, zero. This method 
is  pursued in  the Mark I11  International Transmission  Model and is 
beyond the scope of  the present chapter.16 The second approach is to 
proceed on the assumption  that the null  hypothesis  of  no monetary 
control is true and perform some classical hypothesis tests. Following 
this second path allows us to avoid the difficulty of  fully specifying the 
variables which belong in S. 
These hypothesis  tests rely  on the difference between  the reduced 
forms for A log M under the null hypothesis and the alternative hypoth- 
esis. Let us rewrite the reduced forms here for comparison: 
(10.6)  A log M = Z6 +  E, 
Z6  A log M = -  xp+-  SX  + - 
1 -  a0  1 -  a0  a0 -  1 
u+-  E.  +- 
a  a0  (10.10)  1 
a0  1 
1-a0  ao-1 
Note that neither Xp nor SX  enters in  the reduced  form if  the null 
hypothesis is true. One test of  the null hypothesis is to add the domestic 
variables Xp  to the reduced form (10.6) and test whether they fail to enter 
as required by the null hypothesis. That is, the null hypothesis implies 
$=Oin 
(10.18)  A log M = $ Xp  + Z6 +  E. 
A more powerful test  would also include SX,  but this requires  a full 
specification of  the alternative hypothesis as noted above. 
The  empirical tests are based on the quarterly data bank and the money 
supply reaction  functions in  the Mark I11 Model, discussed above in 
chapters 3  and 5, respectively.  We must  first specify which  variables 
appear in the vector Z.  Stockman (1979) follows the standard practice of 
explaining the first difference of money demand as the first difference of a 
Cagan or long-run money-demand function: 
(10.19)  A log M=61+ 82A logy + 63AR + 84A log P+  q. 
The  further assumption is made that the change in domestic real income 
A log y is exogenous and that the domestic interest rate R and price level 
16. See chapters 5 and6  above. Equation (10.9) can be thought of  as a semireduced form 
of  all the non-reaction-function  equations in the model. Stockman (1979) dealt with this 
problem by implicitly assuming Sh = 0 in equation (10.9) and estimating transformations of 
equations (10.1) and (10.9)  by  two-stage least squares. Since SA f 0 if  the  alternative 
hypothesis is true, his estimates of 1/8  are inconsistent and likely biased toward zero. In view 
of this specification error, his failure to find evidence of  monetary control does not seem 
very  informative.  This and other criticisms  apply to Argy  and Kouri  (1974), Genberg 
(1976), and Connolly and Taylor (1979). If one is to use a simultaneous-equation approach, 
the general model must be fully specified. See Laskar (1980) for a formal analysis of  the 
biases in the tests of  Stockman et al. 306  Chapter Ten 
P are exogenously determined by the foreign interest rate Ru and the 
exchange-rate-converted foreign price level EP,: 
(10.20)  AR = ARu + o, 
(10.21)  A log P = A log(EP,)  + +. 
The disturbances o  and + permit exogenous shifts in the interest and 
purchasing-power parities and would have variance 0 in the most extreme 
versions of  the monetary approach. Thus the Stockman version of  the 
reduced form (10.6) is 
(10.22)  A log M = 61 + SZA  log JJ + S3AR" 
+ S4A log (EP,)  +  E, 
where E = q + S30 +  &,+.I8  Table 10.1 reports estimates of the reduced- 
form (and structural) equation (10.6) for A log M on this specification of 
Zfor all seven nonreserve countries in the data bank. The pegged periods 
used in the estimates are indicated in the table. These regressions seem 
very poor compared to standard monetary-approach results. The reason 
is that standard estimates move domestic credit to the right-hand side on 
the erroneous assumption that it is exogenous. This provides a spuriously 
high R2.  Direct estimates (not tabulated here) of equation (10.19) with 
domestic variables are also insignificant for three of the countries; so the 
specification (10.19) is somewhat suspect. 
Following Genberg (1976), we can improve the fit of the regressions by 
using the short-run money-demand function introduced by Chow (1966). 
This amounts to adding the change in the logarithm of lagged real money 
or A log (M/P)-  to the vector Z. Table 10.2  reports the results obtained 
using the Chow specification. These results are rather more favorable to 
the monetary approach although the R2  are not very impressive in an 
absolute sense  .I9  There is some evidence of  residual autocorrelation for 
Japan and the Netherlands, but this disappears in the more correctly 
specified test equations. Let us now proceed to the reduced-form tests. 
17. As pointed  out by Magee (1976), the assumption that A log y  is exogenous may 
unduly favor the monetary approach. The foreign interest rate RU is the U.S. three-month 
treasury  bill rate. Also,  following Stockman (1979), PF is an income-weighted index of 
foreign prices. All tables in this chapter were  also computed  using the exchange-rate- 
converted U.S. price index EP, instead of  EP,.  The standard errors were generally a bit 
lower for the form reported here, but the basic results were qualitatively the same. The 
alternate tables are available upon request from the author. 
18. Obviously the estimated coefficients will be biased estimates of the values in equa- 
tion (10.19) if there are exogenous shifts in the parities; this does not affect the validity of the 
tests conducted so long as those shifts are unrelated to the variables in Xas  discussed below. 
19. Generally the R2  values are better when domestic variables are substituted for the 
foreign variables. For Italy, however, only a poor measure of  the domestic interest rate is 
available and it does notably worse; indeed, Italy is the only regression not significant at the 
10% or better level using domestic variables. Table 10.1  Estimates of Modified-Monetary-Approach  Equation: Long-Run Money Demand Version 
A log M = 61  + 62A log y + 63AR" + 64A log (EPF) +  E 
Coefficients 
- 
Country  Period  61  62  63  64  S.E.E.  R2  D-W 
UK  19571-7111  0.008 
(0.003) 
2.520 
CA  1962111-701  0.025 
(0.007) 
3.794 
FR  19581-7111  0.028 
(0.003) 
10.664 
GE  19571-71  0.018 
8.860 
IT  19571-7 111  0.028 
(0.004) 
7.111 
JA  19571-7 1  I1  0.030 
(0.006) 
5.117 
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-0.450 
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-  1.170 
-  0.218 
(0.092) 













0.018  -0.045  1.46 
0.011  0.188**  1.93 
0.013  0.094**  0.68 
0.011  0.169**  1.44 
0.014  0.014  1.37 
0.020  0.013  0.99 
0.014  0.060*  1.92 
Notes. Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates; t statistics are below the standard errors. 
One asterisk after the E2  indicates rejection of  the hypothesis ti2 = 63 = b4  = 0 at better than 0.10 level, two asterisks at better than 0.05 level. Table 10.2  Estimates of Modified-Monetary-Approach Equation: Chow Money Demand Version 
A log M = 61  + 8ZA log y + 6,AR"  + 84A log (EPF)  + 85A log (M/P)_  1 +  E 
Coefficients  Durbin's 
h  - 
Country  6,  82  83  84  6s  S.E.E.  R2  [D-W]' 
UK  0.008  0.047  0.123  0.023  0.279  0.018  0.012  [1.95] 
(0.003)  (0.198)  (0.469)  (0.157)  (0.137) 
2.691  0.240  0.263  0.150  2.032 
CA  0.025  -0.211  -  1.667  -  0.598  -  0.052  0.012  0.160*  1.10 
(0.007)  (0.262)  (0.622)  (0.529)  (0.163) 
3.731  -0.805  -2.680  -  1.130  -0.316 
FR  0.015  0.050  -0.415  -  0.078  0.617  0.009  0.568**  1.50 
(0.003)  (0.064)  (0.243)  (0.067)  (0.083) 
6.137  0.776  -  1.705  -1.166  7.465 
GE  0.015  0.326  -0.201  0.311  0.197  0.011  0.196**  1.05 
(0.003)  (0.100)  (0.278)  (0.119)  (0.118) 
5.036  3.254  -0.721  2.613  1.663 
(0.005)  (0.143)  (0.364)  (0.365)  (0.138) 
4.692  0.514  -  0.887  0.950  2.116 
IT  0.022  0.073  -  0.323  0.346  0.292  0.014  0.074*  [  1.981 
JA  0.021  0.032  0.128  0.320  0.486  0.018  0.219**  2.26 
(0.006)  (0.160)  (0.477)  (0.472)  (0.125) 
3.638  0.198  0.269  0.680  3.896 
NE  0.015  0.336  -0.136  0.009  ,0157  0.014  0.074*  -2.10 
(0.003)  (0.148)  (0.355)  (0.236)  (0.117) 
4.808  2.278  -0.384  0.037  1.341 
Notes. Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates; t statistics are below the standard errors. 
One asterisk after the E2  indicates rejection of the hypothesis Ei2  = 6,  = 84 = 0 at better than 0.10 level, two asterisks at better than 0.05 level. 
'In  those cases in which Durbin's h cannot be calculated (is imaginary), the (biased) Durbin-Watson statistic is reported instead in square brackets. 309  Sterilization and Monetary Control 
The reaction functions in the Mark I11 Model are very general in form 
to allow  for cross-country  differences in timing  of  response. For the 
pegged  period;  included  variables,  other  than  a  scaled  balance-of- 
payments term, are a time trend, current and lagged unexpected real 
government spending, lagged semiannual inflation rates, lagged unem- 
ployment  rates  or logarithmic  transitory incomes,  and lagged  scaled 
balance of payments. When all these variables (except the current BIH) 
are added to the regressions reported in tables 10.1 and 10.2, we can do 
the joint test of  whether the coefficients of the additional variables are all 
zero as implied by  the null hypothesis. The results of  these F tests are 
reported in table 10.3. For the Chow money demand function the mod- 
ified monetary approach (no monetary control) is rejected stongly for the 
United Kingdom, France, and Japan and at the 10% significance level for 
Canada and Germany. Similar, though more erratic, results are obtained 
for the long-run money demand function. Consider the tests, however: 
Table 10.3  F Tests for Unconstrained Addition of Domestic-Policy 
Reaction Function Variables 
F Statistics 
Chow Money  Long-Run Money 
Country  Demand Function  Demand Function 
UK  2.241 (12, 41)  2.731 (12, 42) 
CA  2.085 (12, 14)  1.495 (12, 15) 
[0.025>p>0.01]  [O.Ol>p>0.005] 
[O. 10>p>0.05]  [p>0.10] 
[0.025>p>0.01]  [  0.001  >p] 
FR  2.658 (12, 37)  4.040 (12, 38) 
GE  1.929 (12, 40)  2.239 (12, 41) 
IT  1.250 (12, 41)  1.651 (12, 42) 
JA  2.643 (12, 41)  4.287 (12, 42) 
NE  1.372 (12, 40)  1.571 (12, 41) 
[O. 1o>p>o. 051  [0.05>p>O. 0251 
[p>0.10]  [p>0.10] 
[0.025>p>0.01]  [0.001>p] 
[p>O.lO]  [p>O.lO] 
Notes. Each F  statistic is followed in parentheses  by  the associated degree of freedom. 
Significance levels are indicated in brackets below the F statistics. 
The significance levels refer to the level at which we would just reject the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients on all reaction  function variables equal zero. The twelve reaction 
function  variables  are  t, g,  + gf-*),  (gf-3 +&+),  (log  Pf-l  -log  f'-3),  (log 
Pf-3 -  log  Pf-sL  uf-l,  ~~-2,  ~~-3,  ~~-4,  [(BIH),-l + (B/ff)f-21,  and  [(B/ff)f-3  + (B/H),-4],  where t is time, g  the innovation in real government spending, P the GNP 
deflator, and u either the unemployment  rate (for the U.K. and France) or logarithmic 
transitory income. 310  Chapter Ten 
They ask whether all the additional variables reduce the sum of squared 
residuals by significantly more than would be expected for such a number 
of unrelated random variables. Since not all of these variables enter any 
given reaction function, this is a low-power test (it is hard to reject the 
null hypothesis). 
A sharper test would include only those variables which actually enter 
the reaction functions for each country. The Mark IV Simulation Model 
described in chapter 7 above is a simplified simulation version of  the 
Mark  I11  International Transmission  Model.  Its specification  of  X  in 
equation (10.1) dropped all variables  with  t statistics less than unity. 
Table 10.4 reports results of  the F tests based upon these country-specific 
money supply reaction functions. We see that only the Netherlands (the 
smallest and most open country in the sample) fails to exhibit significant 
correlation between money growth and the money supply variables. Thus 
these reduced-form  tests generally confirm the results obtained using 
structural models by Herring and Marston (1977), Darby and Stockman 
(chapter 6 above), and Laskar (1980): Nonreserve countries exercised a 
significant degree of  control over their domestic money supplies within a 
quarter. Thus even the modified monetary approach is unacceptable for 
analysis of  quarterly data. 
Table 10.4  F Tests for Addition of  Mark IV Model Domestic-Policy 
Reaction Function Variables 
F Statistics 
Chow Money  Long-Run Money 
Country  Demand Function  Demand Function 
UK  4.071 (7, 46) 
[0.005>p>0.001] 
CA  3.312 (5, 21) 
[0.025>p>0.01] 
[0.005  >p>O.001] 
FR  3.413 (9, 40) 
GE  3.205 (3, 49) 




JA  4.463 (6, 47) 
NE  1.432 (8, 44) 
[p>0.10] 




1.958 (5, 22) 
4.869 (9, 41) 
3.658 (3, 50) 
[0.025>p>0.01] 
3.082 (6, 48) 
[0.025>p>0.01] 
7.021 (6, 48) 
[  0.001  >p 1 
[p>0.10] 
1.705 (8, 45) 
Note. Each F  statistic is followed in parentheses by  the associated degrees of  freedom. 
Significance levels are indicated in brackets below the F statistics. 311  Sterilization and Monetary Control 
Two reservations  should be noted:  (1) The money supply demand 
functions do not fit very well by U.S.  standards  and may be misspecified. 
However, since they are the standard forms in the literature and a stable, 
known money demand function is essential to the monetary approach, 
this provides little comfort to adherents of  the monetary approach. (2) 
The variables  in X  might  enter because they  are correlated with the 
exogenous parity shifts o  and +. This could conceivably be the case, but 
an examination of  the list in the notes to table 10.3  provides no obvious 
or, to this writer, even plausible candidates. 
10.3  Summary and Conclusions 
Recent empirical research on sterilization had demonstrated that stan- 
dard monetary-approach models which assume domestic credit exoge- 
nous  are invalid.  This paper presents  a  modified-monetary-approach 
model which  retains  the message of  central bank  impotence despite 
extensive sterilization activities. A more general model was also sketched 
under which the central bank’s policy objectives do influence the change 
in the money supply. Whether a nonreserve central bank can determine 
its domestic money supply in the short run was shown to depend on 
whether one or more of  the conditions are met: goods are perfect substi- 
tutes, assets  are perfect  substitutes,  or expected  depreciation is  too 
responsive to changes in the balance of  payments. The responsiveness in 
this  new  third  condition  may  depend on the size of  the balance  of 
payments so that central bank monetary control is feasible only within a 
limited range. 
The reduced-form  tests showed  strong evidence of  the exercise of 
monetary control within the quarter for the United Kingdom, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Only for the Netherlands could we 
not reject the restriction on the more general model which implies the 
applicability of the modified monetary approach. These results confirm in 
a relatively model-free manner earlier findings based on specific struc- 
tural models. They therefore answer suggestions that those earlier results 
are due to peculiarities in the structural model. There is no reason for 
predetermined money supply reaction function variables to be correlated 
with realized money growth unless the nonreserve central bank could and 
did exercise a degree of  monetary control. 
These results need not indicate any long-run monetary control; indeed, 
even short-run monetary control may be feasible only between the limits 
at which overwhelming speculative capital flows are induced. But the 
strong implications of  the monetary approach (in standard or modified 
form) no longer appear tenable for use with quarterly data. Instead,  more 
general macroeconomic models must be specified and tested to explain 
the simultaneous  determination of  nominal money and the balance of 
payments under pegged exchange rates. 312  Chapter Ten 
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